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COMMENTS
SALES-MERGER CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS FOR THE
SALE OF GOODS
The following hypothetical case will illustrate the problem to be
discussed. P Company sends its salesman, A, into the field to sell
trucks. A contacts T, with whom he negotiates for the sale of a truck.
During the negotiations, A makes a reckless statement that his company will back everything he says about their trucks. He represents
that a truck designed to carry eight tons will safely carry ten; or
that X company has used its trucks for years and has always been
satisfied; or that he thinks each truck is good for 150,000 miles,
while the average mileage of that type of truck is around 100,000
miles; or that the P Company guarantees 50,000 miles without a
breakdown, while it actually guarantees six months or 10,000 miles,
whichever occurs first; or that P Company will not sell the same type
of truck with special equipment to any of T's competitors.
When T signs the order or contract, there is a merger clause
therein, plainly visible, which states that P Company is not bound
by any prior or contemporaneous statements made by its agent and
that no promises, warranties or guarantees have been relied upon by
T that are not included in the written contract or order.
The problem presented concerns the binding power of the merger
clause, and which of the several types of statements outlined above
will constitute sufficient ground for an action in the nature of deceit
for damages; which type will permit rescission and preclude any action by P Company on the contract; and which type will not affect
the validity of the contract as written because of the merger clause.
Of the several relations between P, A and T which may lead to
a contract, this discussion will be limited to one, namely, where there
are no direct dealings between P and T, and A acts without authority
or knowledge of P. The question of validity of the contract normally
arises as a defense or counterclaim to the suit for the purchase price.
Generally, when a written contract is alleged to be invalid for fraud
in its procurement, or any other reason, oral testimony is admissible
to show the circumstances of the execution. This is not varying the
terms of the contract so much as it is throwing light upon its character.
It is showing that legally there is no such contract in existence as is
alleged by P,1 and it is, therefore, no exception to the parol evi2
dence rule.
C. Smith & Co. v. W. M. Hurlburt Co., 93 Conn. 391: 106 A. 310 (1919),
McJunkin v. Richfield Oil Corp., (D. C. Cal.), 33 F. Supp. 466 (1940).
2 Southern St. Ry. Adv. Co. v. Metropole Shoe Mfg. Co., 91 Md. 61, 46 A. 513
(1900).
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As a general rule, a salesman does not have the power to bind
the principal to sales contracts. The written instrument usually assumes the form of an order to be signed by the purchaser and the
salesman, and, in some cases, by the purchaser only. Such an instrument does not effect a sale until accepted by the principal, and usually
that is stated in the instrument.
The addition of a merger clause in a contract for the sale of
goods presents the question as to whether such a clause will estop
or in any way prevent T from introducing evidence that would be
admissible under the general rule as to written instruments stated
above. Some courts have excluded evidence on the basis of the
parol evidence rule. Other courts base the exclusion on the ground
of estoppel, which would make it a rule of substantive law. The
better rule, if one of exclusion is to be applied, seems to be that
such evidence is irrelevant and to be rejected because of the rule of
substantive law which binds parties to the contract as written notwithstanding any inconsistent, enlarging, or collateral agreements. The
inclination of the courts though is to receive parol evidence whenever
the interests of justice require.
It is the presumed intention of parties who reduce their contract
to writing that all prior negotiations pertaining to the subject matter
of the contract are integrated therein. 3 When, however, fraud is alleged, evidence is generally admissible to show that the instrument
sued on is not the contract 6f the parties. However, where the contract contains a merger clause, the instrument being in the form of
an order for goods and not binding until accepted by P, courts following the line of reasoning based on the Massachusetts rule4 have
held that the fraud is that of T, who has submitted a false offer to P.
A's representations only induced the negotiations leading to the offer,
but T's misrepresentations induced the sale. The purchaser states in
the writing that he does not rely on any promises, warranties or
guarantees other than those contained in the instrument. To allow
T to refute this statement is to allow him to assert a purely subjective and unilateral misunderstanding against P. P has no way
of knowing what unauthorized statements the agent has made and
has a right to rely on the word of the purchaser that none have been
3 Williston on Contracts, vol. 3, sec. 811 A; Strain-Johnson Const. Co. v. Riverview Furniture Co., 227 Mich. 55, 198 N.W. 714 (1924) ; Haglin v. Ashley, 212
Minn. 445, 4 N.W. (2d) 109 (1942) ; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Jewett,
169 Wis. 102, 171 N.W. 757 (1919) ; Derbeck v. Albright, 186 Wis. 515, 203 N.W.
337 (1925) ; presumption is conclusive in absence of fraud or mistake: Starry
v. Starry & Lynch, 212 Iowa 274, 234 N.W. 281 (1931) ; Stone v. Steil, 20 Mich.
249, 202 N.W. 982 (1925); Victor Products Corp. v. Yates-Amer. Mach. Co.

(1932; CCA 4th), 54 F (2d) 1062.

4 Colonial Development Corp. v. Bragdon, 219 Mass. 170, 106 N.E. 633 (1914);

Noack v. Standard Stores, Inc., 281 Mass. 53, 183 N.E. 54 (1932).
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made. On the other hand, the New York rule5 stresses fraud, overlooking negligence, at the expense of the sanctity of the writing, stating that the courts dislike negligence but abhor fraud.
The negotiations relied upon by the buyer may be of several kinds.
The salesman may have made a collateral agreement that P Company
would sell to T and to no others within a given area. The salesman
may have stated falsely that no others marketed the particular product in that area. He may have made warranties as to the quality or
capabilities of the product. Under the Massachusetts rule, if strictly
applied, none of these could be introduced into evidence since the
merger clause denies the existence of any representations other than
those which are in the written contract. Actually the rule is not
strictly applied in any state.
The New York rule throws out the merger clause when fraud is
alleged and lowers the written instrument to the level of oral agreements.6 In practical application, each court has set up one of the
extremes as the general rule and makes exceptions liberally as the
cases arise. Such a course of action puts the admission of such evidence largely within the discretion of the trial judge. This in turn
places business practices and contracts on a very insecure footing.
The better policy is to follow the principle that a man should know
what he signs, and, in order to add to or to contradict the writing,
he should show a clear case of injustice, in addition to proving
fraud by clear and satisfactory evidence. That, in most cases, appears
to be the unstated rule. Some courts also require that a consideration be shown for alleged unwritten collateral agreements.7 Courts
following the New York rule are more inclined to allow extraneous
proof of fraud. This inclination is based on the principle that fraud
vitiates every contract and, in any case, overbalances negligence.
The merger clause is effective to exclude several types of evidence.
A mere expression of opinion by the agent is not considered sufficient
to deceive or misrepresent, no one having a right to rely thereon
where he should know that it is but an opinion.$ If the statement
made is on a subject peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent,9
The White Company, 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N.Y.S. 204 (1936).
See also: Note, 56 ALR 13. Cf. Ernest Iron Works, Inc. v. Duralith Corp. 270
N.Y. 165, 200 N.E. 683 (1936); An express agreement made in a contract that
it shall be uncontestable for fraud is against public policy and void, Malas v.
Lounsbury, 193 Wis. 531, 214 N.W. 332 (1927).

5 Angerosa v.

6 See Distributors Investment Co. v. Batton, 130 Tex. 449, 110 S. W. (2d) 47
(1937).
I Adams v. Gillig, 199 N.Y. 314, 92 N.E. 670, 32 LRA (NS) 127, 20 Ann. Cas.
910 (1910).
8 Precluding recission: Dotson v. Kirk, 103 C.C.A. 368, 180 F. 14, 23 (1910);
precluding damages: Watkins v. West Wytheville Land & Improvement Co., 91

Va. 1, 22 S.E. 554, 556 (1895).
0 White Sewing Machine Co. v. Bullock, 161 N.C. 1, 76 S.E. 634 (1912) ; Bixler
v. Wright, 116 Me. 133, 100 ATL. 467 (1917); see also: Ohrmundt v. Spiegelhoff, 175 Wis. 214, 184 N.W. 692 (1921).
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one on which the buyer could base no opinion of his own, two rules
are applied. The statement made must be to a material part of the
subject matter of the contract, such that, if the buyer had known
its falsity, he would not have made the contract. 0 The jury must
find that he had a reasonable right to rely thereon. 1 Thus, general
statements of facts per se cannot be regarded any more favorably
than statements of opinion. 12 For the same reason, it has been held
that the buyer had no right to rely on representations where falsity
was readily discoverable by an examination of the contract.' 3
A misrepresentation by A to T as to the contents of the order
or writing would amount to fraud in the inception of the contract.
It is normally a jury question as to whether T was negligent in not
reading the instrument and as to whether his reliance on such statements was reasonable. Other courts have held that, if he has been
given sufficient time to read the contract, he had no right as a matter
-of law to rely on such statements.' 4 Thus, where T has knowledge
of the clause, he should not be allowed to plead fraud as a defense.
The merger clause is considered by some courts as a notice to T
of a limitation of A's authority. 15 Such notice is constructed upon
the presumption that the negligent purchaser has read the contract.
Should this presumption be conclusive or rebuttable? If there is
no merger clause, there is the implied understanding in every such
transactioi that T's offer contains the whole agreement. With the
merger clause in the contract, there is a positive statement to that
effect. If T had read the order, he would have knowledge of A's
limited authority and would thus be estopped from asserting prior or
collateral agreements, warranties, br guarantees. Since he has not
read the order he does not know of the merger clause, and, to allow
proof of misrepresentations is to put a premium on negligence.
In many courts T would be allowed to rescind if the clause were
not present, and in some cases, he would be allowed positive relief
in the form of damages. In many of the same courts, if a merger
clause is shown, T will either not be allowed to introduce evidence
attacking the contract, or will be denied relief because of the clause.
Thus, it can be seen that a showing of negligence on the part of T
10 Greenawalt v. Rogers, 151 Cal. 630, 91 P. 526, 528 (1907), citing Calton v.
Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 399, 23 P. 16, 28; 16 Am.St.Rep. 137 (1890); Cf. Not
necessary that there be a fraudulent intent; Blydenburgh v. Welsh, 3 Fed. Cas.

771, 774 (1831).
"Supra, fn. 5.
12 Pat v. J.S. McWilliams Auto Co., 193 Ark. 620, 101 S.W. (2d) 794, 127 ALR

139 (1937).
Weaver v. Roberson, 134 Ga. 149, 67 S.E. 662 (1910) ; Green v. Cox. Machinery
Co., 116 Okl. 255, 244 P. 414 (1926).
4
1 Trujillo v. Wichita Farm Lighting Co., 91 Colo. 307, 14 P. (2d) 1009 (1932);
Angerosa v. The White Co., supra, note 5.; See Note 75 ALR 1032 et seq.
'5 Trujillo v. Wichita Farm Lighting Co., supra, fn. 14.
23

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

in not reading what he signed is of importance. This emphasizes
the necessity of placing the clause in a conspicuous place, preferably
directly over the place for signature, in bold type.
The merger clause, in addition to excluding opinions, general
statements, and acting as a notice of limitation of authority of A,
may be used by the proponent to show the intent of the parties that
the writing was to contain the full agreement to the exclusion of
prior or collateral agreements.' 8 P may further safeguard his rights
by a stipulation in the merger clause that the contract contains the
agreement in full and cannot be added to except by another signed
agreement.' 7
Some courts have applied the rule that P cannot adopt the beneficial parts of a contract and at the same time reject the representations that have been made by A in procuring the contract.' This
doctrine is an almost insuperable bar to any affirmative action by P
on the contract. As to T's adoption of the merger clause, courts
generally require a sufficient opportunity for assent to the clause.' 9
The latter rule allows evidence pertaining to the actual signing of the
order by T, and presents a jury question to be considered with negligence of T.
In the course of negotiations between A and T, many so-called
"agreements" or "understandings" may arise. Oftentimes no meeting
of the minds takes place on pertinent or collateral issues. On the trial,
these most probably will be the very facts in issue. If the rules pertaining to the admission of evidence and those giving great weight
to written instruments are relaxed, it naturally follows that the parties
making those instruments will be more lax in their execution. The
contrary also follows - that if proof of injustice along with a high
degree of proof of fraud or mistake are required, contracts will be
more complete, the amount of litigation on minor points will decline.
The rules applied in cases where actual fraud and injustice have
been proved recognize two distinct types of actions based on the
status of the parties to the contract at the time of commencement of
the action. Where the contract is executory, the courts have granted
rescission more readily; neither party will be injured. Where the
purchaser has acted because of the contract and would be injured
by a simple rescission, the court will sometimes allow an action or
Johns-Manville Corp. v. Heckart, 129 Or. 505, 277 P. 821 (1929). Where fraud
involved: Pratt v. Darling, 125 Wis. 93, 103 N.W. 229 (1905) ; James v. Brandt,
173 Wis. 539, 181 N.W. 813 (1921). In the absence of fraud, see note: 127 ALR
132 (denying relief).
"7 Hauer v. Martin, 284 Pa. 407, 131 A. 187 (1925) citing Gross v. Exeter Machine
Works' Inc 277 Pa. 363, 367, 121 A. 195, 196-(1923).
a Supra, fn. 5.
'9 Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 38 N.E. 458 (1894) ; Noack v. Standard
Stores, Inc., supra, fn. 4.
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counterclaim for damages. Where P is innocent of the fraud, it
appears that rescission alone should be granted.
The merger clause effects a difference between the right to rescind
and the right to damages for deceit. Without the clause, P would
be liable in tort for fraud of his agent acting in the apparent scope
of his authority, but by stipulating in the contract that the agent has
no such authority, P has done all that is reasonably possible to give
notice of such limitation to T. The innocent principal in such circumstances should be relieved of liability when he has placed it
within the power of T to obtain actual notice. Where P sues to
recover on the contract, he is seeking to benefit through his agent's
fraud. This he cannot do. His personal liability may be avoided,
but the fraudulently procured contract is subject to recission."
How may the prinicipal protect himself? First the agent should
be equipped with a sufficient knowledge of the product he is selling, its proven advantages over other products and its capabilities,
to minimize the possibility of A resorting to false promises and representations. Second, the agent should be given clear instructions as
to the manner of presenting and executing the written instrument.
He should point out the merger clause to T at the time of execution, giving T sufficient time to read the clause and the contract.
It is particularly essential that no collateral agreements or representations be made at the time of execution. A should make it clear
that he has no power to execute the contract - that the writing
consists of an offer on the part of T and does not become a contract
until accepted by P. A policy should be adopted and made known
to T that on acceptance P will send a letter of acknowledgement and
confirmation of the contract. After the execution it is advisable to
leave a duplicate copy of the order with T.
The contract itself should contain all the conditions of the agreement. If P wishes to protect himself against any contingencies the
clauses pertaining thereto should not be hidden. It is essential that
the merger clause be printed in bold face type, preferably directly
over the signature. It should "stand out." The clause should be
concise and composed to refer as closely as possible to the particular
article being sold. It should be remembered that if it can be at all
inferred from the complexity of the instrument that P is attempting
to protect himself without T's knowledge of that fact, the clause will
be of no effect.
ALBERT
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Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Coats, 4 Cal. (2d) 319, 48 P. (2d) 662 (1935).
See also: Duralith Corp. v. Van Houten, 133 N.J.L. 374, 174 A. 484 (1934).

